Coming to Our Senses: Narratology and the Visual by Huck, Christian
 
Coming to Our Senses: Narratology and the Visual
Christian Huck
published in: Modeling Mediacy: Point of View, Perspective, Focalization, ed.
Peter Hiithn, Wolf Schmidt, and Jérg Schonert.
Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 2009, 201-218.
CHRISTIAN HUCK
(London)
Coming to Our Senses: Narratology and the Visual
I Introduction
Marco Polo is believed to have traveled about 14.000 miles during his
lifetime; Ibn Battuta, the great Arab explorer of the middle ages, managed
about 75.000. But both were dwarfed by the Englishman James Holman, a
retired naval officer, who traveled roughly 250.000 miles in the first half
of the 19™ century—before the arrival of trains, steam boats and planes.
He trekked deep into Siberia, sailed to Brazil, rode through southern
Africa, explored unmapped parts of Australia and survived the bandit-
infested Balkans. However, the most remarkable thing about all this is
that Holman had been blind since the age of twenty-four—he made all his
travels without seeing where he was going: he heard, smelled and felt his
way cautiously through the world. “While vision gulps, tactility sips,” his
biographer notes, “an object yields up its qualities not all at once, at the
speed of light, but successively over time, and in sequence of necessity.”
(Roberts 2006: 69) However, despite his obvious achievements, Holman
was never taken seriously by his contemporaries, and was soon forgotten.
His experiences were deemed invalid for the simple reason that he could
not use his visual sense: “His sightlessness makes genuine insight impos-
sible” (Roberts 2006: xii). The Enlightenment’s epistemological paradigm
of the eyewitness did not allow for other sense data to become the basis
for new knowledge.
In this article, I want to compare two travelogues that mark the sub-
mission of the travel report to the paradigm of the eyewitness. The two
texts in question are Daniel Defoe’s Tour through the Whole Island of
Great Britain (1724-26) and Edward Ward’s account of his ramblings
through London in The London Spy, originally published as a periodical
between 1698 and 1699. While the two texts deal with roughly the same
subject matter, London around the year 1700, they present two very dii-
ferent accounts of it. In line with the century’s empiricist imperative to
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observe, both emphasize that they will only report those things they have
personally witnessed. However, the resulting reports could not be more
unlike. Defoe’s calm, plain, and objective description of the streets and
buildings of the city is contrasted by Ward’s rushed, exuberant and ex-
cited account of its inhabitants. How can the two descriptions be so dif-
ferent, when the perceived object is basically the same?
A literary historian might credit this difference in description to dif-
ferent political aims: the Whig Defoe is trying to present an economically
progressive Britain, while the Tory satirist Ward attempts to ridicule the
human follies of his fellow citizens suffering the consequences of (early)
modernity. Narratologically speaking, they consequently show very dif-
ferent points of view, they reveal a markedly different “perspective” on
things, they “focalize” different aspects of the city. However, instead of
explaining the differing accounts with reference to the ideological back-
grounds of the authors and thus making “only” metaphorical use of the
terminology, I want to analyze a difference manifested in the creation of
two specific narrator-figures, the employment of their senses, and the re-
lation between perception and reporting which these narrators reveal.
It becomes obvious, when analyzing the two texts more closely, that
while perception in Defoe’s text is restricted to the visual, the narrator in
Ward’s text employs all kinds of sensory perceptions. The attempt to de-
scribe and theorize the different narrators, then, leads to the question,
whether there is an aural, olfactory or even a haptic equivalent to a point
of view: a point of smell, maybe, or a point of taste? What would be the
difference between these? And could a specific mode of perceiving (a
story) influence the mode of reporting (in discourse)? As there are few
predecessors which to build on, and as studies of the impact of perceptual
regimes on modes ol writing are still rare, all I will be able to offer here is
a tentative investigation of what is at stake in the relation between
“perspective” and the senses, and a few suggestions concerning how and
why this relation could and should be further explored.
2 The Rise of the Visual
However persistent and/or ambivalent the classical “Greek privileging of
vision” (Jay 1993: 33) and however “ocularphobic” (36) the Middle Ages
might have been, the “ocularcentrism” of post-Renaissance culture would
be difficult to deny: “vision, aided by new technologies, became the dom-
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inant sense in the modern world” (45). The importance of the visual soon
became pervasive:
From the curious, observant scientist to the exhibitionist, self-displaying couttier,
from the private reader of printed books to the painter of perspectival landscapes,
from the map-making colonizer of foreign lands to the quantifying businessman
guided by instrumental rationality, modern men and women opened their eyes and
beheld a world unveiled to their eager gazes. (69)
Although by no means a homogeneous field, the visual sense came to be
dominated by the particularly influential scopic regime of linecar perspec-
tive, embodied by the technical device of the camera obscura (ct. Crary
1990: 27-29). Liidemann outlines how this scopic regime establishes a
specific observer position: It gives
the observer the illusion he could see without being involved, that he could see, with-
out being seen, without changing the observed through observing and without himself
being changed by the act of observing: The subject that sees by means of linear per-
spective installs itself behind the window of the “peep show” [...] in the position of a
secret, for himself and others invisible voyeur. Consequently, he is an empirical sub-
ject only in a very limited sense. While he is in the world in the emphatic sense that
the things of the world organize themselves according to his perspective [...], he is at
the same time distanced from the world by this very act. Like the Cartesian cogifo the
observer is berelt of his body. (Liidemann 1999: 66)'
As I want to argue in the following, it is such an observer position that a
text like Defoe’s ascribes to its narrator, a narrator curiously situated at
the same time in and out of the world he describes. But it is also the ob-
server position that forms the basis for the concept of the perceptive/re-
flective figure in (classical) narratology”.
Throughout the nineteenth century, a new mode of observing evolved:
the “mirror” was replaced by the “lamp” as the paradigm for (artistic)
vision (cf. Abrams 1953). This new scopic regime was one of “subjective
vision, a vision that had been taken out of the incorporal relations of the
camera obscura and relocated in the human body” (Crary 1990: 16). Two
aspects of this new development appear crucial. On the one hand, the re-
placement of the mirror by the lamp, or of the camera obscura by the la-
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terna magica, 1s a replacement of one scopic regime for another; the
dominance of the visual remains unaffected. On the other hand, the new
scopic regime has to be interpreted in a specific way so that it can be inte-
grated into the narratological framework. As Klepper (2004) has recently
argued, the central shift from the old to the new scopic regime is based on
the deconstruction of transparency: while older texts assumed the possi-
bility of an mmpartial observer, later ones reveal the partiality of every
(subjective) observation. It seems to me that narratological theory takes
this later, adaptive, “Jamesian” stance as its starting point and reinterprets
earlier narratives accordingly, 1. e. that they, also, were biased. However,
this theory inherits or adopts both the visual bias and the epistemological
model of the older scopic regime, because it interprets a constructive
mode of observation within the wider framework of perspectivism, of
which the (Cartesian) linear perspective is understood to be only one par-
ticular instance. In the framework of narratology, the observer is, as 1 will
argue, still watching from inside a camera obscura, albeit one which has a
distorting prism in its hole.
3 Ut pictura poesis: Narratology and the Visual
Classical narratological theory, from Henry James to Franz Stanzel and
Gérard Genette, was developed in response to the novel of the 18" and
19" centuries. Given that these centuries mark the heyday of the primacy
of visual observation, it comes as no surprise that the classical texts of this
era and subsequently the theories concerned with these should also show
a strong visual bias (cf. Klepper 2004). The narrator—or character whose
perceptions the narrator reports—is generally conceived as a subject that
perceives its (fictional) world almost exclusively visually.
The question whether such visual bias poses a problem for narratology
did not seem important to most theoreticians, who touch on it only slight-
ly—if at all. Bal’s definition of “focalization”, for example, could not be
more visual: “Whenever events are presented, they are always presented
from within a certain ‘vision’. A point of view is chosen, a certain way of
seeing things, a certain angle”. “Focalization 1s,” she continues, “the re-
lation between the vision and that which is ‘seen’, perceived” (Bal 1985:
100). Without further ado, she makes “seeing” stand in for all forms of
perception. Bal seems to follow Genette, who thinks it enough to “take up
[...] the slightly more abstract term focalization,” to “avoid the too spe-
cifically visual connotations of the terms vision, field, and point ofview”
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(Genette 1980: 189). However, when revisiting his theory, Genette claims
that his “only regret is that [he] used a purely visual, and hence overly
narrow, formulation”. Consequently, he wants to “replace who sees? with
the broader question of who perceives?” (Genette 1988: 64). Similarly, in
their chapter on “Focalization” Martinez and Scheffel appear to realize
the reductive pairing of “who sees” and “who speaks”, but think it enough
to add in brackets: “(‘seeing’ should be understood here in the more
general sense of ‘perceiving’)” (Martinez & Scheffel 1999: 64). Finally,
Rimmon-Kenan also hopes with Genette and Bal that the more abstract
term of “focalization” can avoid “the specifically visual connotations of
‘point of view’,” but admits that even this new terminology “is not free of
optical-photographic connotations” and proclaims that “its purely visual
sense has to be broadened to include cognitive, emotive and ideological
orientation” (Rimmon-Kenan 1983: 71). But although she declares her
intention to transgress the limits of the “purely visual sense of
‘focalization’” and acknowledges that perception also includes “hearing,
smell, etc.,” all her examples remain within the realm of the visual (77).
Quite obviously, this visual bias of narratological terminology and the
failure to amend it have not gone unnoticed. In what might be called post-
classical narratology, I found at least two possibilities to interpret these
findings. The first follows the line set out already by Rimmon-Kenan and
claims, in the words of Niederhoff, that “the metaphorical character of a
scientific term does not diminish its suitability” (Niederhoff 2001: 4-5).
The conceptual model, this suggests, remains unhampered by the termi-
nology. Chatman, for example, claims: “Genette has always seemed to
mean more by focalization than the mere power of sight. He obviously re-
fers to the whole spectrum of perception: hearing, tasting, smelling, and
so on” (Chatman 1986: 192). Prince takes the substitution of “seeing” for
“perceiving” even further:
Note [...] that the verb “perceive” is to be taken in a broad rather than narrow accep-
tation: to apprehend with the senses (to see, hear, touch, etc.) or with the mind, or with
something like their equivalent. In other words, what is perceived may be abstract or
concrete, tangible or intangible—sights, sounds, smells, or thoughts, feelings, dreams,
and so on. (Prince 2001: 44)
According to this line of thinking, one can amend the terminology and
leave the underlying model untouched. Consequently, Nelles, following
Jost, distinguishes between “ocularization”, the visual element of focal-
ization, “auricularization”, the “aural point of view” (cf. Jost 1983), gus-
tativization, olfactivization, and tactivilization (cf. Nelles 1997: 95-96).
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The problem T have with such supplementation lies in the subordination
of different senses under a model that was quite obviously developed with
the visual in mind. When Prince defines point of view as “yielding that
which might be perceived from a certain perspective” (Prince 2005: 442),
he 1s simply substituting the wider term perceiving for the old “seeing”,
but consequently must suggest that we smell or taste “from a certain
perspective”™—which, T think, already stretches the metaphor, and the
model, a bit too far, as does the idea of an “aural point of view”. I will
return to the problem of “perspective” in regard to other senses later.
A second line of response to the visual bias of the terminology seems
to accept that the terminology is not just arbitrary, but a metaphor we live
by, not a surface problem, but one that conceptually frames our thinking.
Consequently, Lanser affirms the visuality of the concept of “point of
view” by conceding, with John Berger and others, the primacy of the
visual over all other senses: “perception is always structured upon a rela-
tionship of perceiver and perceived—upon a point ofview” (Lanser 1981:
4). In a similar way, Niinning and Niinning affirm the visual bias of their
term “perspective”: “The traditional correlation of visual-optic and cog-
nitive aspects, which is already conditioned etymologically, is as much a
constant of the term perspective as is the close relation to epistemological
dualism.” (Niinning & Niinning 2001: 8) Quite obviously, this is a perfect
tool for analyzing works created within the 18" and 19™ century frame-
work of representational realism. For Niinning and Niinning, however,
perspective 1s, systematically, “the prism through which all environment-
tal stimuli are refracted” (12)-—thereby tuming a historically and cul-
turally situated philosophical framework into a given premise for nar-
ratological reasoning. Neither can this model incorporate a sense like tac-
tility, which defies a neat compartmentalization of object, idea and
subject-observer, nor is it suitable for radical forms of subjective per-
ception, where the creative act goes beyond the “refracting” of given
stimuli. As I understand it, Niinning and Niinning’s metaphor of the
“prism” allows them to include a subjective/constructivist “perspective”
into an otherwise Cartesian epistemology—by putting a prism into the
hole of the camera obscura, and leaving it otherwise intact. As a conse-
quence, the narratologically conceived observer sees the (fictional) world
through a prism even if he is smelling or hearing.
Is “pomt of view”, as much as focalization and perspective, then, just
another example of the primacy of the visual in our culture and the he-
gemony of the scopic regime of perspective within this culture? Is nar-
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ratology simply mirroring what a plethora of recent studies have iden-
tified as the dominance of the visual in modern culture? Is narratology,
then, just another instance of what McLuhan understands as a central
consequence of the rise of the Gutenberg Galaxy, that is, the “reduction of
experience to a single sense, the visual, as a result of typography”
(McLuhan 1962: 125)? Is there, as Uspenskij claimed in his article, a
“Structural Isomorphism of Verbal and Visual Art” (1972)7?
To a certain degree I would answer these questions positively. Con-
sequently, a use of terms such as “point of view” or “perspective”, which
affirms its visual bias and consequently limits itself to analyses of visual
perception within a certain cultural framework, is surely appropriate; also,
such analyses should do justice to the bulk of mainstream 18™ and 19
century novels. When it comes to dealing with other than visual sense
perceptions, though, I would disagree with Nelles that we can success-
fully examine these within the given framework. In the following, I will
attempt to exemplify the limits of the visual narratological terminology
(and framework) in a comparative examination of the above mentioned
texts by Defoe and Ward—and their differing perceptual and narrative
modes. Here, McLuhan’s claim of the relation between seeing and print-
ing will also have to be re-examined.
4 A Terminological Re-Approximation
The fact that I am dealing with two factual texts seems to by-pass large
parts of what is normally discussed under the terms perspective, focal-
ization, or point-of-view, and what the title of this book reveals as the
central function of these terms: mediation. As Nelles defines it: “Focal-
isation is a relation between the narrator’s report and the character’s
thoughts” (Nelles 1997: 79). Or, as Jahn elaborates in more detail:
Focalization denotes the perspectival restriction and orientation of narrative informa-
tion relative to somebody’s (usually a character’s) perception, imagination, knowl-
edge, or point-of-view. Hence, focalization theory covers the various means of regu-
lating, selecting, and channeling narrative information, particularly of seeing events
from somebody’s point of view [...]. (Jahn 2005: 173)
Stanzel’s “Typenkreis”, Genette’s tripartition and Bal’s refinement as
much as Niinning’s “Perspektivenstruktur”, all deal, essentially, with the
informational relation between a “character” and a “narrator”. So what 1f
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there 1s no character-perspective from which to distinguish a narrator-per-
spective, and consequently no mediation between the two?
At first glance, there seems to be no immediate distinction between a
subject of perception and a subject of narration in factual texts. Who per-
celves? Daniel Defoe. Who narrates? Daniel Defoe. Genette’s famous in-
centive for dealing with focalization in the first place, the intention to dis-
tinguish between “who perceives” and “who speaks”, seems to become
rather trrelevant. But is that true? It is quite obvious that what Daniel
Defoe perceives is not the same as what he narrates: the diegetic world,
although not fictional, is still a “version” of the real world. It is as
unlikely that Defoe never smelled anything in the whole of Britain® as it
is that he never interacted with anyone on his travels—and of neither of
which does he tell us. But that does not mean he is lying, he does not
necessarily hold back information.
It 1s my conviction that both Defoe and Ward create a specific
narrator-figure whose conception is responsible for the selection of per-
ceptions. The relation that I want to focus on, then, is the relation between
the “bias” of perception and the “bias” of narrating. As mentioned above,
I am going to concentrate on sensory differences of perception, leaving
ideological questions aside®. Also, I will leave aside the question what
degree of “reality” the perceptual position of the narrator actually had for
Defoe: was he so convinced of this perceptual position that he actually
masked any smell, sound, etc., so that his conscious perception actually
became purely visual? Or is it just a conceptual constriction of which he
was well aware? Was his perception determined by the discursive cultural
framework or did he simply write what he thought was expected from
him?
Putting aside questions like these and despite the dangers of adding
even more narratological terms to an already well stacked pile, I want to
distinguish the two separate acts involved here as “slanted perception” on
the one hand and “narrative focalization™ on the other’. I think it impor-
tant to uphold a distinction, terminologically and conceptually, between
the act of perception and the act of reporting (cf. Schmid 2008: 129—
 
See further Cockayne’s (2007) timely reminder of the sensual assaults the eighteenth
century provided.
However, as might be deduced from the following, certain ideological positions seem
to go hand in hand with certain perceptual positions.
Etymologically, the optical connotation of “focus” supplanted the older sense of
“hearth”. For me, then, “focalization” means concentrating on the heated center.
e 
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30)—even when dealing with factual accounts. My proposed distinction
seems close to Jesch and Stein’s contribution in this collection, although
mine is not restricted to fictional texts, and neither does it deal with the
perceptual act of characters as such: “The first element is the perception
of the world invented by the author through narrators and other agents
also invented by the author; the second element is the regulation of
narrative information within the communication between author and
reader” (59).
However, against Jesch and Stein I would argue that both entities are
always present: never is there a perception without slant, and never 1is
there a narration without focalization. While this, I assume, should be
undisputed, as Schmid has successfully argued (cf. Schmid 2008: 120-
21), the much more interesting question for me is whether there 1s a
connection between the way perception is slanted and the way reporting 1s
focalized. And more specifically: how does the way perception is
conceptualized influence what one has to say about the world one travels?
In my analysis of Defoe and Ward 1 will argue that there are culturally
and historically specific models that suggest specific relations between
the two acts, limiting the systematically available possibilities.
However, while the proposed terminology might be better adapted to
diferent sense perceptions, it still remains within the realms of epis-
temological dualism. As long as the conceptual framework of diegetic
world-making, of the distinction between narrator and story-world, forms
the foundation of narratological theory (and it might turn out to be indis-
pensable), “point of view” and related concepts remain central: “The
novel and other narrative genres cannot escape the question at stake be-
cause they necessarily model a world and afford a specific viewpoint on
this world” (Klepper 2004: 460). As will become clear, texts like Ward’s
reveal the limits of such frameworks; and all I can offer here is a pointer
towards these limits from within this framework.
5 The Traveler’s Senses
Daniel Defoe’s A Tour through the Whole Island of Great Britain formed
part of a new vogue in travel writing, dealing with Britain instead of far-
away and exotic places on the one hand, and discarding scholastic ac-
counts on the other. A predecessor to Defoe admits in his preface that
“voluminous Treatises of this Nature” already seem to exist. But: “what
so eminently distinguishes our Ingenious Author from most, if not all, is
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that he presents you here with nothing but his own Ocular Observations.”
Older authors, “confining themselves to their Studies,” can only report
what they “have taken upon the bare Credit of those, who were, perhaps,
more slothful than themselves” (anon. 1694: n. pag.).
Detoe follows this new tradition. He also promises to report nothing
“but what he has been an Eye-witness of himself” (Defoe 1724-26: 1, 48),
and he, too, praises his own work for not being “rais’d upon the burrow’d
lights of other Observers” (48). When he relates a “long Fabulous Story”
that some “Historians” (108) tell, he discards the fable with the following
words: “I satisty myself with transcribing the Matter of Fact, and then
leave it as I find it” (108). However, this commitment is at the same time
the source of a central problem in Defoe’s book. Defoe’s use of letters,
which are supposed to be reports of several separate circuits, is to ensure
hig status as an eyewitness. In order to prove that his report is accurate,
Defoe creates an easily discernible narrator figure who gives detailed de-
scriptions of the traveled topography. In keeping with the empiricist doc-
trine of the age, the subjective point of view is to guarantee an objective
account’. However, as we know today, the (empirical) author Daniel
Defoe not only collected information on diverse travels that failed to
match the reported circuits, he also used several secondary sources, and
only much later brought the collected information into a coherent form.
The narrative account, 1t appears, was created at another place, and an-
other time, than the diverse perceptions.
What I want to argue now is that the temporal and spatial detachment
of the act of perception and the act of reporting is mirrored in the per-
ceptual position Defoe ascribes to his narrator. In whatever way the real
author’s perception was slanted, the narrator in the text has a peculiar and
easily discernible slant of perception. In alliance with the 18™ century’s
predominant concept of visual perception, Defoe seems to be traveling
within a transportable walk-in camera obscura; he poses as a distanced
observer to whom the world presents itself as if through an incorruptible
machine. The following depiction of a camera obscura represents this
conception perfectly.
 
 See Jay (1993: 64): “Intersubjective visual witnessing was a fundamental source of
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Figure 1: Athanasii Kircheri, Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae, 1671: 709 (extract).
The distance between Defoe’s narrator, who poses as an experiencing
figure, and the described objects correlates with the effects of the process
of writing. The distance which the writer, sitting in his study, experiences
in relation to the described objects finds its perfect embodiment in the
idea of a transportable walk-in camera obscura. The camera obscura, as
Crary has analyzed, “performs an operation of individuation; that 1s, it
necessarily defines an observer as isolated, enclosed, and autonomous
within its dark confines” (Crary 1990: 38-39). The observer is cast as “a
free sovereign individual and a privatized subject confined in a quasi-do-
mestic space, cut off from a public exterior world” (39). Incidentally, this
is also a perfect description of the situation of writers and readers emerg-
ing in the eighteenth-century7, sitting alone in their respective domestic,
private closets (cf. Heyl 2004: 506-26): “The reader can open the door of
a novel, enter, and quietly shut the door behind him” (Zimbardo 1978: 8).
He or she is alone and not alone at the same time: “A thousand readers
indeed stare, from their closets, into a single mirror of print, and each of
them does it alone” (Hunter 1984: 285). The author, similarly writing on
his or her own, by means of this device, can, as Fielding has it, “hold the
7 The changes in question here are to be seen in relation to the older paradigm of the
scribe—collectively writing in a monastery—and the paradigm of the audience—ex-
periencing collectively in the theatre.
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(lass to thousands in their Closets” (Fielding 1742: 6). Here, scientific-
philosophical empiricism, the technique of the camera obscura and the
new situation of the reader seem to converge: “The camera, or room, [or
book; C. H.] 1s the site within which an orderly projection of the world, of
extended substance, is made available for inspection by the mind” (Crary
1990:46).
However, the concept of the camera obscura has consequences not
only for the perceiving subject, but for the perceived object, too: a multi-
faceted “thing” is turned into a purely visual semiotic sign—sound, smell,
taste, touch; nothing of this can be reproduced within the box. Finally,
objects can be looked at without having the chance of looking back; per-
ception 1s bereft of any reciprocity. Correspondingly, in the act of read-
ing, the object of observation is present only as mediated and physically
absent: one can observe the object, without having to experience it in its
full presence and without having to fear that it might stare back. (And if it
does, as in some printed pictures, this feels uncanny.) Therefore, the sort
of actual and symbolic distance involved when perceiving an object vis-
ually through the camera obscura makes possible the uninvolved stance
of Defoe’s account. Narratologically, this position is embodied nowhere
better than in the heterodiegetic narrator of the classical realist novel, and
although Defoe’s narrator is strictly speaking homodiegetic, 1. e. a part of
the story of Britain, he nonetheless appears to remain external to this
world. From this position, Defoe develops his calm and objective mode of
writing, his now legendary “concise, clear prose,” his “plain, easy,
straightforward style” (Backscheider 1986: 46, 53). However, such nar-
rative mode would seem quite at odds with an observer who claims to be
“in the thick of it”, interacting and turn-taking. Rather, this mode of nar-
rating is only credible in relation to the peculiar narrator-observer position
developed by Defoe, being there but not there at the same time—Ilike the
camera (and the audience) in a classical Hollywood production, protected
by the “fourth wall”.
The only time Defoe gets carried away is when describing the society
at Tunbridge-Wells, a place full of “Fops, Fools, Beaus, and the like”
(Defoe 1724-26: 1, 165), where “you are surpriz’d to see the Walks
covered with ladies compleatly dress’d and gay to profusion; where rich
Cloths, Jewels, and Beauty [...] dazzles the Eyes” (164). Bedazzled by
such spectacle Defoe rants about the dangers at such places, and the slan-
der that increases such dangers, and finally has to cut himself short before
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perplexing encounter, Defoe appears to have avoided every contact with
living human beings while on his travels. Although the subtitle of his
book promises an account of the “Customs, Manners, Speech, as also the
Exercises, Diversions, and Employment of the People,” the inhabitants of
Britain “receive little attention beyond the remark that the population 1s
increasing” (Feldmann 1997: 37). When dealing with the capital, Defoe
admits that “by London [...], I mean, all the Buildings, Places, Hamlets,
and Villages contain’d in the line of Circumvallation” (Defoe 1724-26:
11, 74)—an imaginary line Defoc has drawn in order to measure the city.
The creation of this line seems to guarantee a vantage point, a perspective
from which the “monstrous City” (74) that London is for Defoe can be
tamed, that is, ordered, chartered. For him, London is nothing more than a
“oreat Mass of Buildings” (74), and consequently he describes the ap-
pearance and function of every important building, market etc.—but nev-
er does he stoop to describe anything that cannot be contained within his
“line of circumvallation” and would suggest a reciprocal, interactional
approach: human beings, for example.
Ned Ward’s London Spy develops a markedly different narrator-figure.
In stark contrast to Defoe’s distanced view of London’s buildings, Ward
constantly reports on not only seeing other people, but also hearing,
smelling, and touching them. His slant of perception is noticeably dif-
ferent from Defoe’s vision. Instead of looking down from above—Defoe
variously describes ascents to specific vantage points in order to have a
better (over-)view—, the Spy is at eye-level. Instead of being distanced,
he is close. As a consequence, the Spy looks and is being looked at, he
hears other people and is heard, he touches them and is touched. Unlike
the linear perspective/camera obscura visual observer, Ward’s narrator is
all too aware of his own physical presence, aware of the effects his pres-
ence has on the observed objects and aware of the consequence such ob-
servations have on him. Finally, he interacts with people—and his report
is full of people.
However, this experience of the social does not necessarily depend on
which senses are used®, but rather on how they are employed. The mode
of observation, whether technically or discursively formed, determines
whether co-presence, reciprocity and interaction, key elements of the so-
cial, are allowed for or not (cf. Bohn 2000). The perceptual stance of the
8 Kant thought the ear to be the privileged sense when it comes to the social, whereas
Simmel opted for the eye; see Bohn (2000: 321-22).
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narrator-observer predetermines, at least to a certain degree, the selection
of as well as the relation to the objects described. And sometimes these
“objects” even cease to be mere objects.
But Ward is no complete exemption from the 18" century’s craze for
all things visual. Rather, the Spy employs his visual sense without com-
pletely subjecting his environment to the demands of unilateral perspec-
tival spectating. Because the Spy includes other than visual sensations, it
seems his mode of visual observation is also different from Defoe’s—he
sees differently, because his relation to the objects of perception is formed
by several senses. Most importantly, the Spy remains receptive on all
channels. This, however, bears certain dangers. Again and again he seems
overwhelmed by his sensory experiences: “nothing I could see but light,
and nothing hear but noise” (Ward 1709: 29). He experiences the city
with a very “acute, and sometimes over-powering awareness of [...] sen-
sory experiences” (Hyland 1993: xv). His ears hear the “sundry passing-
bells, the rattling of coaches, and the melancholy ditties of ‘Hot Baked
Wardens and Pippins!”” (Ward 1709: 29); he sees the “dazzling lights
whose bright reflections so glittered in my eyes” (29); his nose smells the
“narrow lane, as dark as a burying-vault, which stunk of stale sprats, piss
and sir-reverence” (39).
In the realm of seeing there seems to be a strong preference for the ob-
served object over the observer, especially under the scopic regime de-
scribed m connection with Defoe. As described above, in the process of
observation, the observed is turned into an independently existing object,
while the observer is fashioned as a separately existing subject, unin-
volved in the “creation” of the perceived object. On the other hand, most
of the non-visual senses require a closer relation to the object of percep-
tion; hearing and tasting, for example, are often conceptualized as “taking
in” the perceived object. The perceived object, finally, takes up such
presence that a specific perspective, defining the individuality of the sub-
ject, 1s not necessarily easily to be made out—the distinction between ob-
server and observed, subject and object threatens to collapse.
The completely opposite mode of writing—excited, emotional, cxu-
berant—, with which Ward’s perceptions are reported, seems to result
from this closeness to the perceived objects and the way this closeness
affects him. Instead of traveling in a confined, distancing and sensually
diminishing camera obscura, Ward’s experiencing figure walks among
his fellow citizens. Being so close, he cannot help but experience other
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from this might be best described as “linguistically overstuffed” (Wall
1998: 137)—drawing attention to the utterance itself rather than the utter-
er. The attempt to render the vast amount of multi-sensorially experienced
details into language leads to an exuberant style that constantly escapes
into similes and analogies when a complete rendering of the multi-
sensorial experience becomes impossible. As a consequence, the reader
has great difficulty locating a similarly well-defined point of view to the
one we find in Defoe. Only rarely can the reader follow where the nar-
rator is, and whom he is speaking to. Often, the reader learns more about
how the narrator is affected by his experiences than about the object that
(apparently) emanates the stimuli. And only rarely is the localization of
the experiencing figure possible: from where is an event heard, or smelled
in the dark? A well-defined, easily locatable perceptual stance appears to
be the privilege of the visual. Impressions, otherwise, do not seem to add
up to a well-defined diegetic world. And although I think there is no
doubt that Ward is narrating, it is not clear whether he is actually mvolved
in world-making.
6 Consequences
The slant of perception of every experiencing figure is heavily influenced
by the inclusion or exclusion of specific senses, by their emphasis or sup-
pression. The perceptual position that results from such a slant, in turn,
influences what a report can include, and how the report is fashioned,;
this, then, is what I termed “narrative focalization”. No report, obviously,
can render all sensory experiences. Therefore, every narration needs a
specifically equipped and positioned experiencing figure, which filters
what can be experienced and consequently determines, at least to a certain
degree, what can be reported. In turn, every form of report needs an
accompanying slant of perception. And while there is no strictly causal
relation between a certain slant of perception and narrative focalization,
there appear to be some culturally suggested default cases at least. Of
course, there is no inherent superiority among different possible positions;
Defoe is clearly able to see something that Ward can not, whereas Ward
can render experiences that Defoe remains blind to. However, the
specificity of these positions warrants close observation.
In the case of Ward and Defoe, attention to their perceptual stance
helps understand their peculiar positions. Both pose as participant-ob-
servers, roaming the world they observe and subsequently describe.
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Defoe’s perceptual stance, however, reveals him as an observer rather
than a participant, while Ward, on the other hand, is marked as a partici-
pant rather than a mere observer. The visual sense, and especially the
scopic regime of the camera obscura, appears to appeal to those who try
to be observers first, whereas a multi-sensorial approach seems to suggest
participation. Closer attention to the perceptual situation and its technical
and discursive determinations, then, might be able to distinguish histori-
cally and culturally specific embodiments of different narrative positions.
Defoe’s heterodiegetic narrator, who 1s at the same time close enough to
see everything but distanced enough not to be seen, as well as Ward’s
specific homodiegetic narrator, can be more closely analyzed with regard
to the use of their senses. And finally, looking at the cultural models or
regimes of perception and reporting in factual accounts might also reveal
what limitations and possibilities fictional narratives encounter.
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